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This article offers a conceptual framework to understand radical change. It
opens with a typology that defines change in terms of its pace and scope, and
defines radical change as the swift transformation of an entire system. How
radical change in public policy has occurred in the past is then documented.
We find examples of radical change by chance, radical change by consensus,
radical change by learning, and radical change by entrepreneurial design.
Radical change by entrepreneurial design then becomes the focal point, in
order to acquaint the reader with the strategies and tactics of well-known
entrepreneurs who have been successful in molding and shaping the radical
change process. The implications of this conceptual framework to acquisition
reform conclude the paper, along with some suggestions for follow-on action.
relationships among them, when different
units, levels of analysis, time frames, and
perspectives are employed.
Ideally, it would be useful to have a
basic road map to guide us through the
conceptual maze. While no map could
possibly cover the entire terrain, one that
puts the major elements of change into
relief would be of advantage. That is the
intention of this article. The goal is to pro-
vide an overview of change—its defini-
tion, scope, pace, and processes, with par-
ticular attention paid to radical change
given the focus of this Special Issue. We
seek to answer such questions as: “What
is change? What are the types of change?
How does change occur?” in order to in-
form the efforts to dramatically transform
Explaining change and how it occurshas been a central theme in manage-ment and related disciplines. In a
recent literature search using change and
development as key words, researchers
found more than a million articles on the
subject in the disciplines of psychology,
sociology, education, business, econom-
ics, as well as biology, medicine, meteo-
rology, and geography (Van de Ven and
Poole, 1995). We know from this research
that concepts, metaphors, and theories
used to investigate change have yielded a
rich, diverse theoretical landscape. Yet, at
the same time, such diversity often has
confounded rather than enlightened. It is
difficult to compare and contrast theories
and their results, let alone work out the
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acquisition policy and process. While ac-
quisition reform is not in the foreground
of this analysis, it certainly provides the
impetus and rationale for this endeavor.
We begin with a conceptual framework
that provides the backdrop for our under-
standing of radical change. We introduce
four types of change that are differenti-
ated by two dimensions—the pace and the
scope of change. Building on these two
dimensions, radical change is defined as
the swift, dramatic transformation of an
entire system. In the next section, we ex-
plore alternative explanations of how radi-
cal change occurs. Here the attention shifts
to how change happens rather than what
actually is changed. Four radical change
processes are examined: radical change
by chance, radical change by consen-
sus, radical change by learning, and radi-
cal change by entrepreneurial design. We
explore radical change by entrepreneurial
design in the next section, since the over-
all focus in the symposium is how indi-
viduals can influence the radical change
process. The intent is to outline various
strategies and tactics that well-known pub-
lic entrepreneurs have employed to affect
radical change. The article concludes by
identifying the conceptual framework’s
most important implications for acquisi-
tion reform, such as whether radical
change in acquisition can be pursued and
who would be the likely public entrepre-
neurs leading the charge.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Change is an empirical observation of
difference in form, quality, or state over
time in an entity (Van de Ven and Poole,
1995). Entities can be such things as a
product, a job, a program, a strategy, a
person, a group, or an organization. Acqui-
sition policy is one such example. Observ-
ing a difference in its form, quality, or state
at different points in time, we would say a
change had occurred. And note that we are
not attributing a value to that change
(whether it is good or bad)—only that it
has happened.
Change is often examined in terms of
its pace and scope. Pace refers to the speed
at which change occurs. It is a relative
concept that has to be embedded and in-
terpreted within a particular context. The
hundred years it took to change from an
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agrarian society to an industrial society
(the Industrial Revolution in Britain) is a
very short time if one examines it against
the backdrop of thousands of years of geo-
logical, biological, and human history. Or
in the instance of acquisition, a policy that
emerges over multiple administrations can
be characterized as slower when compared
to policies that are put in place by the
stroke of one presidential pen.
Scope delimits the range of possibili-
ties in an entity. For example, are we ex-
amining the change of an entire organiza-
tion or are we examining one aspect of
change in the personnel department? Or
in the case of acquisition policy, are we
referring to the entire policy or only a sub-
set that pertains to a particular regulation
or routine? Thus, scope can be viewed in
terms of parts or wholes. Are we attempt-
ing to change the whole entity or only one
of its many subsystems?
Scope and pace, if treated as two di-
mensions of change, produce four differ-
ent types of change (Figure 1). Element
adaptation refers to minimal modifica-
tions in one part of the system to ensure that
the part is in better alignment with the
system’s other elements. It is a movement
of convergence rather than divergence for
the purpose of improving the system’s
overall functioning and efficiency. The
assumption is that unless all the system’s
parts are aligned with one another, the
system will not be operating at its opti-
mum level. Since the alignment evolves
over time in continuous steps as modest
adjustments are made to one part of the
system and then another, the pace is char-
acterized as slow rather than fast. This type
of change is often referred to in the litera-
ture as first-order change (Watzlawick,
Weakland, and Fisch, 1974), branch
change (Lindblom, 1959), evolutionary
change (Greiner, 1972), single-loop learn-
ing (Argyris and Schon, 1978), continu-
ous change (Meyer, Goes, and Brooks,
1993), incremental change (Tushman and
Romanelli, 1985), and momentum change
(Miller and Friesen, 1980). It describes
modest adjustments by small degrees to
parts of an existing system which itself
remains unchanged.
System adaptation refers to a change
in the system itself rather than a modifica-
tion in one of its parts. It often is character-
ized as a discontinuity or a jump from an
initial system to a new one. Representing
Figure 1. Typology of Change
Scope of Change
Part Whole
Slow Element Adaptation System Adaptation
Pace of Change
Fast Element Transformation System Transformation
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a qualitative rather than a quantitative shift
in the way things are done, it is marked
by divergence rather than convergence. In-
stead of a focus on the alignment of a
system’s part to improve system effi-
ciency, as in the instance of element ad-
aptation, the purpose is to realign the parts
to form a new whole in order to achieve
system effectiveness. However, since this
new system emerges in continuous steps
over a longer
period of time,





provides one example. Subsystem changes
in production, agriculture, education, ur-
banization co-evolved and emerged over
a period of years, and ultimately yielded
a dramatic reconfiguration of society as a
whole.
Element transformation refers to a dra-
matic shift in a system’s part in a relatively
short period of time. The system itself does
not undergo a radical reconfiguration, but
only a subsystem or element. Evidence of
element transformation can be seen in the
introduction of a radically new computer
system to an organization. Expected to
enhance the organization’s ability to
handle information flow and to increase
its efficiency, the new computer system is
not intended to have a spillover affect in
the rest of the organization. The plan is to
have the organization’s other elements
continue to operate as they always have.
Thus, the radical change is localized in one
element of the organization and does not
extend to all of its parts or the whole.
System transformation represents a
dramatic break from one system to another
in a very short period of time. It is charac-
terized by a change in the system itself
rather than a modification of one of its
parts. Recent examples at the national
level come from New Zealand’s dramatic
transformation from a command economy
to a market economy and the Soviet
Union’s shift from a totalitarian to a demo-
cratic state. The literature refers to this
type of change as root change (Lindblom,
1959), radical change (Tushman and
Romanelli, 1985), revolutionary change
(Gerlach and Hines, 1973) transformation
(Hernes, 1976), double-loop learning
(Argyris and Schon, 1978), paradigm
change (Sheldon, 1980), quantum change
(Miller and Friesen, 1980), and discon-
tinuous change (Nadler, Shaw, and
Walton, 1995). Throughout the rest of this
article we will refer to this type of change
as radical change.
These four types of change drawn from
the above typology are not necessarily mu-
tually exclusive. It is possible to combine
types of change into an overarching theory
of change. For example, the theory of
“punctuated equilibrium” views change as
the alternation between long periods when
stable infrastructures permit only incre-
mental adaptations (as in element adapta-
tions), and relatively brief periods of revo-
lutionary upheaval marked by discontinu-
ous change (as in system transformation)
(Gersick, 1988; 1991; Kuhn, 1970;
Prigogine and Stengers, 1984; Tushman
and Romanelli, 1985). Baumgartner and
Jones (1991) found evidence of punctu-
ated equilibrium when they examined
public policies from a historical perspec-
ive. Many policies went through long
periods of stability punctuated by short
periods of dramatic change. The “grand lines
of policy” are often settled, sometimes for
Radical Change by Entrepreneurial Design
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decades, during these critical periods of
disequilibrium when old policy values and
assumptions are challenged and displaced
by radically new ones. Thus, as in the case
of punctuated equilibrium, one type of
change can combine with another to yield
a more complex theory of change.
THE PROCESS OF RADICAL CHANGE
Thus far we have examined change
from the vantage point of pace and scope
and defined radical change as a swift, dra-
matic transformation of an entire system.
Change also can be explored in terms of
its dynamics (how it occurs rather than
what actually happens.) From a process
perspective, the interest is in the sequences
of events and the generative mechanisms
that drive the process to explain how
change unfolds. Our unit of analysis for
this inquiry will be the domain of public
policy rather than any one organizational
entity since acquisition reform spans mul-
tiple organizations and contexts.
When we examine the dominant mod-
els to explain changes in public policy, we
find that most are devoted to the explora-
tion of slow, adaptive changes rather than
radical, transformational changes. Instead
of focusing on major shifts in a system, or
the dramatic turn of policy events, atten-
tion is drawn to explaining the continuity
of public policy and the relatively small
adjustments made to the status quo
(Lindblom, 1959; Cobb and Elder, 1983;
Ripley and Franklin, 1991). The empha-
sis is not surprising. As Herbert Kaufman
reminds us, “the logic of collective life has
a conservative thrust; it lends authority to
the system as it stands” (1971, p. 10).
Yet we do find instances of system
transformations occurring in public poli-
cies. British and Swedish welfare policy
was fundamentally altered during the first
several decades of this century (Heclo,
1974). During the mid-1970s in the United
States, there were major policy shifts un-
der way concerning clean air (Jones,
1975), tobacco (Fritschler, 1989), deregu-
lation (Derthick and Quirk, 1985), pesti-
cides (Bosso, 1987), and nuclear power
(Campbell, 1988). The question we now
turn to is how these system-wide trans-
formations oc-












literature that attempt to explain the dy-
namics of radical policy change: radical
change by chance, radical change by con-
sensus, radical change by learning, and by
radical change by entrepreneurial design.
Of particular interest is the design perspec-
tive, which treats political actors as ca-
pable of taking strategic, transformative
actions and managing the change effort.
RADICAL POLICY CHANGE BY CHANCE
Using a revised version of the Cohen-
March-Olsen (1972) garbage can model




in public policy, we


















(1984) conceives of three process streams
to describe the policy arena. There are
streams of problems, policies, and poli-
tics, each largely independent of one an-
other and each developing according to
its own dynamics and rule (p. 20). Poli-
cies are generated whether or not they are
solving a problem; problems are recog-
nized whether or not there is a solution;
and political dynamics move along at their
own pace. The greatest policy changes
occur when the three streams (policy prob-
lems, policy ideas, and proposals) are
joined through a choice opportunity, or
“coupled into a package” (p. 21). This ser-
endipitous linkage often relies on policy
entrepreneurs “for coupling solutions to
problems and for coupling both problems
and solutions to politics” (p. 21). Indeed,
“the appearance of a skillful entrepreneur
enhances the probability of a coupling”
(p. 217). While not completely random,












text that alter constraints and opportuni-
ties for policy actors. We have examples
of such shifts in the Arab oil boycott of
1973–1974 and the passage of California’s
Proposition 13.
While radical change by chance keeps
us humble in any change effort, ever aware
of the limits to human management and
control of a very complex process, the
accidental, serendipitous nature of trans-
formational change that Kingdon de-
scribes leaves little room to explore how
participants might take advantage of “win-
dows of opportunity.” We are left won-
dering how to couple the streams of policy
problems, ideas, and politics for radical
change. On these aspects, the theory is
mute. Thus we turn to the next theory of
radical change to understand how partici-
pants might be more directly involved in
the change process.
RADICAL CHANGE BY CONCENSUS
According to Wildavsky, in the United
States there are three political cultures:
“different shared values justifying social
relations...[that] orient people to political
life” (Coyle and Wildavsky, 1987, p. 3).
The three are hierarchical collectivism,
competitive individualism, and egalitarian
collectivism (Wildavsky, 1982; Coyle and
Wildavsky, 1987). Radical policy change
occurs when the elites of these three po-
litical cultures find an integrative solution
that meets their preferences. (They do not
need to agree on exactly why the radical
change meets their desires, only that it
does).
Hierarchical collectivism asserts that
human nature is fundamentally flawed. As
a consequence, this political culture pro-
motes the establishment of “good institu-
tions to prevent the Hobbesian ‘war of all
against all’” (Coyle and Wildavsky, 1987,
p. 4). Central authority is supported in all
social, political, and economic spheres,
since differentiation and subordination is
expected to produce stability. And to en-
sure this stability, hierarchical collectiv-
ism promotes equality before the law.
Radical Change by Entrepreneurial Design
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“In terms of acquisi-
tion policy, we would
expect radical policy
change to occur if
and when the elites
of these three politi-
cal cultures were
able to develop an
integrative solution
or consensus on







Using the example of poverty, one would
explain poverty as resulting from “failing
to follow rules of proper conduct and the
advice of expert authorities” (p. 5). Hier-
archs, therefore, would support paternal-
istic social policies (e.g., food, clothing,
and moral guidance to the needy) since
the poor could not be trusted to look after
their own interests (pp. 4–5).
Competitive individualism posits that
human nature depends on circumstance.
Benefits flow when human nature is al-
lowed to be free and flourish. Thus, au-
thority is minimized and self-regulation
is promoted. Equity of opportunity is im-
portant to support competition and bilat-
eral bargaining is viewed as the mecha-
nism to achieve growth. From this per-
spective, again using the example of pov-
erty, one could explain poverty as stem-
ming from either personal incapacity or
interference from central authorities who
dampen individual initiative. Individual-
ists maintain that it is the responsibility
of each person to escape poverty; the gov-
ernment should not intervene to tell people
how to do it (pp. 4–5).
Egalitarian collectivism maintains that
“human nature is fundamentally good ex-
cept when corrupted by evil institutions”
(p. 4). It follows that authority is rejected
in favor of giving each person equal in-
fluence. Equal influence derives from
equal conditions to support equal out-
comes. And substantive equality is
achieved through persuasion and group
unanimity. Thus, egalitarians would blame
“the system”(bad institutions) that op-
presses the poor in the case of poverty.
They would find paternalism offensive
because it implies that some are wiser than
others and therefore should have more
power than others. Ultimately, they would
support policies that seek to redistribute
incomes and resources (pp. 4–5).
One example of a radical change by
consensus can be found in the Reagan
administration’s ability to win acceptance
of a broader based, lower rate personal and
corporate income tax in the 1980s (Coyle
and Wildavsky, 1987). In terms of acqui-
sition policy, we would expect radical

















more play for in-
dividual actors
in this theory of radical policy change, es-
pecially among the political elites, the fo-
cus is on the reconciliation of their ideas
and the compatibility of their values pref-
erences rather than the management of the
change process per se. The theory pre-
sumes that as long as value preferences
among the elite are compatible, the execu-
tion of any policy would not be problem-
atic, an assumption that the implementa-
tion literature has successfully challenged
(Bardach, 1977). To understand the con-
tributions of others in the policy change
process, in addition to the activities of the
elites, and to take a fuller view of the en-
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tire policy process, we have to turn to the
next theory of radical change.
RADICAL CHANGE BY LEARNING
Radical change by learning comes
about through the interaction of advocacy
coalitions—people “who share a particu-
lar belief system (i.e., a set of basic val-
ues, causal assumptions, and problem per-
ceptions and who show a nontrivial de-
gree of coordinated activity over time”)
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 25).
Members can include researchers, ana-
lysts, journalists, administrators, interest
group members, and elected officials. An
advocacy coalition can produce radical
change through policy-oriented learning,
defined as “belief system modification”
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 49),
by generating technical information and

















without politically unacceptable costs. Al-
though interaction between advocacy coa-
litions often produces a “dialogue of the
deaf” (p. 48), it is possible for different
advocacy coalitions to have a productive
analytical debate and learn from each
other. Learning tends to occur when there
is an intermediate level of informed con-
flict between advocacy coalitions, when
policy issues have a greater analytical trac-
tability (i.e., have “widely accepted theo-
ries and quantitative indicators”), and
when a professionalized forum exists in
which “experts from competing coalitions
must justify their claims before their
peers” (p. 55).
Thus, learning by an advocacy coali-
tion may demonstrate such deficiencies in
another advocacy coalition’s core beliefs
such that it is possible for a system-wide
shift to occur, usually at the instigation of
system-wide leaders. One such change oc-
curred when economists demonstrated
over a period of 20 years the inefficien-
cies of government regulation of airline
fares, which eventually led to the aboli-
tion of the Civil Aeronautics Board and
airline deregulation. It also should be
noted that such change will not come
about solely due to the learning activities
internal to the policy subsystem. Changes
of this magnitude are usually accompa-
nied by an exogenous shock that alters
the resources and opportunities of the
various coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1993, p. 220).
The studies of advocacy coalitions
gives much more guidance on the process
of radical change compared to the previ-
ous two process theories. The approach
recommended is analytical problem solv-
ing between specialists in advocacy coa-
litions who have acquired the skills and
knowledge of the policy domain in ques-
tion. The theory is silent, however, on a
number of other issues. For example, it






people ‘who share a
particular belief














actors who have a
radically new idea
that they want to
see implemented.”
the political dynamics that are likely to be
provoked in a radical change process, es-
pecially change involving ideas and issues
that are not tractable and lack a forum
where experts can justify their claims
among their peers. The microlevel activi-
ties also are not addressed because the unit
of analysis is the coalition rather than the
individual actor. For advice on how indi-
vidual actors influence the political dy-
namics of the change process, we must




Entrepreneurial design begins with con-
scious, deliberate activities of policy ac-
tors who have a radically new idea that
they want to see implemented. It is a “te-
leological approach to change” because
individuals are assumed to be capable of
purposeful and adaptive behavior; by
themselves or in interaction with others,
they are able to envision an end state and
take action to reach it, while monitoring
their progress along the way (Van de Ven
and Poole, 1995).
Policy entrepreneurs, as these policy
actors are often called, are similar to ana-
lysts in that they seek to determine the
nature of a problem and its cause, the po-
tential range of solutions, and the most im-
portant strategy to achieve their desired
outcome or idea given the available re-
sources. However, policy entrepreneurs
move well beyond the rational analytic
approach to be effective agents of radical
change. Ever mindful of the political re-
alities, they are concerned with framing
their ideas in the best possible light in
order to attract and expand their base of
support. Their strategies and tactics are de-
signed to overcome resistance, undermine
the strength of the opposition, and sell
power holders on the merits of their ideas.
Building a coalition and keeping it focused
on their policy objective is a priority, not
just through policy formulation, but also
through implementation and evaluation.











choice was initiated and designed by six
policy entrepreneurs, and championed by
Gov. Rudy Perpich. It was viewed as the
solution to the “problem” of a bureaucratic
educational system that was unresponsive
to student and societal needs. “Open en-
rollment,” as it was called, was expected
to create a modified market within the
public school system by enabling students
to choose which public school district they
wanted to attend. To push the ideas for-
ward, the policy entrepreneurs developed
an elaborate structure of activities that
enabled them, over a period of four years,
to convince others of the merits of their
innovative idea. Although criticized as
radical educational change, choice was
eventually implemented and extended
throughout the K–12 system in Minnesota
and is now under consideration in other
states as well.
Thus, of the four theories of radical
change, only the fourth really explores
Acquisition Review Quarterly—Spring 1998
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“Policy entrepre-
neurs also tend to
operate in teams or






how individuals can influence and mold
the change process. The next section ex-
plores the range of entrepreneurial activi-
ties and demonstrates how successful en-
trepreneurs are able to create opportuni-
ties and minimize constraints as they fight
their way through the change process.
POLICY ENTREPRENEURS AS
AGENTS OF RADICAL CHANGE
Research has uncovered a wide-rang-
ing set of activities in which policy entre-
preneurs and change agents engage. They
employ rhetoric, symbols, and analysis to
frame the policy problem in a way that
promotes their views and their preferred
solution (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991;
Riker, 1986; Stone, 1980). They are stu-
dents of the policy process and the way
bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, and in-












them the most leverage for change
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; Schneider
and Ingram, 1990). They develop and
choose particular strategies that assist
them in building support for their innova-
tive ideas, including changes in institu-
tional rules and norms to further their
cause (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991).
They try, whenever possible, to avoid
opposition. But when that is not possible,
they develop strategies and tactics to over-
come resistance, including active partici-
pation by the media (Gifford, Horan, and
White, 1992). They build coalitions, draw-
ing support from elites who are effective
in persuading others to participate
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). And they
select tools designed to induce policy-rel-
evant behavior (Salamon, 1989).
Conducting a fine-grain analysis of six
policy entrepreneurs, Roberts and King
(1996) found that policy entrepreneurs op-
erate in all policy phases, from policy ini-
tiation through policy implementation and
evaluation. Their direct and long-lasting
involvement enables them to protect and
shepherd their innovative ideas all the way
through the policy process, leaving less
to chance in the hands of legislators, admin-
istrators, implementors, and evaluators.
Policy entrepreneurs also tend to oper-
ate in teams or groups in order to better
support and coordinate the complex ac-
tivities involved in radical change. Their
logic is as follows. Since radical ideas
deviate from existing practice, the more
radical the idea, the more resistance is
likely to be engendered, and the more re-
sistance, the greater the need for collec-
tive entrepreneurship to protect the fledg-
ling ideas and to overcome the opposition.
Such a collectivity also needs to learn how
to work together as a team and to attract
resources in their press for radical change.
Creative ways to finance and support the
team’s change efforts prompts them to
develop an ecology of organizational sup-
port to sustain their entrepreneurial ven-
tures over time. In pursuing these ventures,
they must be careful to attract grassroots
support, not just elites, in the pursuit of
radical change.
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117
Figure 2 (“Activity Structure of Policy
Entrepreneurs”) identifies the activity
structure of six policy entrepreneurs un-
covered in this longitudinal study of radi-
cal policy change (Roberts and King,
1996). “Creative and intellectual activi-
ties” are an important point of departure
for policy entrepreneurship. Policy entre-
preneurs generate new ideas and frame
policy issues in such a way to demonstrate
how their new ideas are the best solution
to current policy problems and how they
stack up against competing alternatives.
They can invent these new ideas de novo
or they can borrow or adapt them from
other policy domains and settings. Once
identified, the new ideas have to be dis-
seminated in whatever form is appropri-
ate (e.g., books, articles, conversations,
speeches, news coverage) to reach the
broadest audience. Attracting support
among politicians and various elites of-
ten requires a good showing in opinion
polls, and convincing the public requires
Creative and Intellectual Activities
Generate ideas
• Invent new policy ideas
• Apply models and ideas from other policy domains
Define policy problem and select solution
• Define performance gap
• Identify preferred solution alternative
Disseminate Ideas
Strategic Activities
Formulate grand strategy and vision
Evolve political strategy
Develop heuristics for action
Mobilization and Execution Activities
Establish demonstration projects
Collaborate with high-profile individuals and elite groups
Cultivate bureaucratic insiders and advocates
Enlist support of elected officials
Form lobby groups and coordinate efforts
Cultivate media attention and support
Administrative and Evaluative Activities
Facilitate program administration
Participate in program evaluation
Figure 2. Activity Structure of Policy Entrepreneurs
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countless hours of work to get the mes-
sage out and have it accepted.
Strategic activities are very important
for policy entrepreneurs, first to formu-
late what their ultimate vision for radical
change is, and second to develop strate-
gies and tactics to deal with changing po-
litical realities. Unless the radical change
agents are very clear about what they want,
it is too easy to get deflected an pushed
off course by others’ goals and objectives.
Political strategies and tactics are essen-
tial too because opposition is expected to
run high, and countering it requires care-
ful planning on how to deflect attacks
likely to come their way. Developing heu-
ristics for action are also important to
guide policy entrepreneurs through the
daily battles and to help them cope with
the disappointments and reversals that are
the natural consequence of pursuing radi-
cal change. The change heuristics devel-
oped by a team of six policy entrepreneurs
are listed in Figure 3 below (“Change Heu-
ristics That Have Stood the Test of Time”).
They evolved these heuristics over years
of experience in working toward radical
change in different policy domains.
In addition to these heuristics, the
policy entrepreneurs were keen observers
of other radical change processes. They
followed the events in New Zealand with
great interest, where radical change has
been under way since 1984. One policy
entrepreneur provided a Wall Street Jour-
nal article titled “The Politics of Successful
1. Know where you want to end up and don’t lose sight of where you are
headed.
2. Don’t play the “Washington game” by trading away the fundamental ele-
ments of the plan. Compromise may yield bad policy: Say “no” rather
than give up the fundamentals of what you really want.
3. Wait for the “background conditions” (political context) to change, thus
necessitating the kind of change that you want.
4. Mature bureaucracies like education rarely initiate meaningful change from
within, so outside pressure is needed to force them to respond.
5. Change never comes through consensus. Get the key leadership to back
your ideas and the “pack will rush to follow.”
6. Money is needed to make change....Get the elites involved.
7. Stay with issues where you have the advantage.
8. Keep the establishment (education in this case) talking about change
and structural issues, and you’ll change some minds.
9. Destabilize the opposition by co-opting one of the establishment groups.
10. Be willing to be bold.
Figure 3. Change Heuristics That Have Stood the Test of Time
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Structural Reform” (Douglas, 1990, p.
A20) to illustrate the similarity between
their change heuristics and those of the
radical reformers in New Zealand. The
purpose of the article, written by New
Zealand’s former finance minister (1984–
1988), was to challenge assumptions people
had of radical change. We highlight some
1. Structural reform (radical change) requires quality people. Good govern-
ment in democratic countries needs politicians who can “get their minds
around complex issues and have the guts to adopt policies” that result in
real reform.
2. Define objectives clearly and implement reforms quickly. Speed is essen-
tial. If you move too slowing the consensus supporting reforms will likely
collapse before results become evident. “It is uncertainty, not speed, that
endangers structural reform programs.”
3. Package reforms in “large bundles.” Real reform is systems reform, not an
unrelated “collection of bits and pieces.” It is important to see linkages
among system parts and use them to enhance all action.
4. Keep the momentum going and do not stop until you have completed the
total effort. You are vulnerable to attack when challenging vested interests,
but a rapidly moving target is much harder for opponents to hit. Stay in
front to lead the debate and remove privileges evenhandedly to reduce
opposition.
5. Maintain confidence and credibility through consistency of policy and com-
munications. Avoid ad hoc decisions and do not waiver from your objec-
tives. “People are unable to cooperate with real reform unless they know
where they are going.” When feasible, spell out intentions in advance. “Suc-
cessful structural reform (radical change) is not possible until you trust,
respect, and inform the electors.” Tell people and keep telling them what
the problem is, how it surfaced, what damage it is doing, what the objec-
tive is, how you will achieve the objective, what the costs and benefits will
be, and why your approach is better than other options.
6. “Don’t blink; public confidence rests on your composure.” Structural re-
form (radical change) demands major changes in attitudes and beliefs. It
causes real concern and discomfort. People will be “hypersensitive to any
signs of similar anxiety” in those responsible for reforms. If people do not
understand the argument, they will judge its merits on their assessment of
your mental and emotional state.
7. When the pressure becomes extreme and there is temptation to accept an
easy ad hoc compromise, remember why you are in politics. In a democ-
racy, holding power forever is not the point. Best use the time to do some-
thing worthwhile. Genuine reform, without compromise, achieves greater
gains than other approaches to decision making.
Source: Douglas, 1990.
Figure 4. Radical Change Heuristics From New Zealand









of the major points in Figure 4 (“Radical
Change Heuristics from New Zealand).
Mobilization and execution activities
expand the entrepreneurial repertoire be-
yond thinking and strategizing to actual
doing. This comprehensive list of their
activities opens up a whole range of op-
tions that can be considered by others.
First, demonstration projects that test new
ideas on a limited basis can provide some
evidence that the radical ideas will work
as predicted. Since evidence to support








port its merits is
difficult), these
demonstration projects, if successful, can
lend some credence to their ideas. Yet
demonstration projects cost money, which
many policy entrepreneurs, operating on
a limited budget, do not have. By neces-
sity, they have to turn to others who do
have the resources, usually elite groups,
foundations, and think tanks that special-
ize in policy ideas and change. In the in-
stance of the six entrepreneurs, they es-
tablished a 501© (3) nonprofit corpora-
tion to serve as the fiscal agent for those
foundations and associations who wished
to support their ideas. A total of $1.2 mil-
lion was eventually collected and funneled
through the nonprofit, including a foun-
dation grant to support one policy
entrepreneur’s research.
To gain even greater credibility for their
ideas, policy entrepreneurs often work
with and through other organizations,
especially those with high visibility and
prestige within the larger community.
Their linkages to high-profile organiza-
tions are particularly useful when these or-
ganizations can be influenced to issue
position papers supportive of the policy
entrepreneurs’ views, as was the case in
Minnesota with the reports from the Min-
nesota Business Partnership and the Citi-
zens League.
Policy entrepreneurs also have to be
careful to cultivate people who are policy
system “insiders,” especially those in gov-
ernment bureaus. To undertake radical
change requires institutional memory and
domain knowledge, insights that often
only come from insiders who know the
details of legislative history, preferences
among the players, and how issues evolve
and develop over time. The policy entre-
preneurs in Minnesota credited a key in-
sider whose advice at critical junctions
made the difference in moving the ideas
forward through the legislative process.
Elected public officials need to be added
to the policy entrepreneurs’ network of
contacts and supporters as well. Radical
change does not occur without their spon-
sorship. Politicians play their part by mov-
ing ideas beyond the discussions among
policy intellectuals and specialists and
onto the agenda for legislative and execu-
tion action. Their careful cultivation and
eventual championship is the sine quo non
of the radical change process. Without
Governor Perpich’s active support in Min-
nesota, for example, public school choice
most likely would still be a topic limited
to policy debates rather than law to be
implemented and evaluated.
Lobby groups also have a role to play.
They demonstrate a visible and broadened
base of support for the radical ideas. As
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“Radical change is
defined as the trans-
formation of a sys-
tem in a relatively
short period of
time.”
an added bonus, members can work to
keep attention focused on the ideas and
provide supporters to do the legwork
(leafleting, testifying at hearings, prepar-
ing briefing notes and speeches, writing
letters to the editor, and meeting with leg-
islators. In the case of the six policy en-
trepreneurs, they not only attracted other
lobby groups to support their cause, but
they built their own lobby group that, by
all accounts, was very effective during
legislative sessions. Press coverage for all
of these activities is also a must. Keeping
the radical ideas before a public often dis-
tracted by the latest crisis and scandal re-
quires a sophisticated understanding of the
news business and a dedication to keep-
ing reporters and their editors intrigued by
the radical ideas and their implications
for the general public. Coverage does
not happen automatically, at least in any
consistent way. It too must be managed.
Finally, influencing radical policy
change requires effort beyond policy for-
mulation. Without regard for the admin-
istration of radical policies—their imple-
mentation and evaluation—ideas embod-
ied in the legislation are particularly vul-
nerable to bureaus that translate the laws
into practice. The danger here is that bu-
reaus, operating from difference frames of
reference and beliefs, may well view the
new ideas that initiate system-wide trans-
formation as too disruptive of their cur-
rent operations. They well may work to
water down the changes or to resist them
altogether, making implementation prob-
lematic. Alliances and advance planning
with administrators and evaluators can
anticipate some this resistance and work
to overcome it, as the Minnesota policy
entrepreneurs found. Well connected with
the commissioner of educator and evalu-
ation specialists, they were able to pro-
vide administrative and evaluative support
to the Depart-
ment of Educa-
tion as it pre-
pared to imple-
ment and evalu-
ate choice in the
public systems
throughout the
state. Their vigilance during the last two
phases of the change process gave the radi-
cal ideas a fair hearing and kept the ideas
from being subverted by school districts
that were not enthusiastic about the new
legislation.
IMPLICATIONS
Radical change is defined as the trans-
formation of a system in a relatively short
period of time. System transformations
can occur by chance, by consensus, by
learning, and by entrepreneurial design.
Thus far we have focused on radical
change or system transformation by en-
trepreneurial design and highlighted some
of the major activities that enable policy
entrepreneurs to be successful. Having
introduced this conceptual framework,
now let’s turn to some specific implica-
tions for acquisition reform.
When considering radical changes in
acquisition, we first need to define the sys-
tem. Is acquisition considered to be the
system or is acquisition a subsystem em-
bedded in a larger system called the “de-
fense system”? The distinction is an im-
portant one. It means the difference be-
tween considering radical change in ac-
quisition policy as an element transforma-
tion or a system transformation. Element







which it must inter-
face would doom the
effort to failure or
at best limit its
impact.”
transformations are very difficult to pur-
sue successfully if the larger system in
which they are embedded are not fully
supportive or compatible, especially if the
element is tightly linked to the larger sys-
tem. In the case of acquisition, a good ar-
gument can be made that it is a critical
element within the larger defense system.










sion. If that situ-
ation obtains,
then the pursuit
of radical change in acquisition without
consideration of the larger system with
which it must interface would doom the
effort to failure or at best limit its impact.
To illustrate the point, let us assume that
a policy has been put in place to empower
program managers and program executive
officers (PMs/PEOs) and enable them to
change and streamline the acquisition pro-
cess (e.g., depend on stable funding, adopt
commercial practices, take risks), or to
empower Contracting Officers (KOs) to
relax acquisition regulations for greater ef-
ficiency. Following the above argument
that considers acquisition tightly linked to
other elements within the defense system,
we would understand that PM/PEO depen-
dence on stable funding is restricted be-
cause Congress controls defense funding,
and program funding is inextricably tied
to the PPBS (Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System). Adopting commercial
practices is also constrained because in-
dustry would be required to behave as a
“market,” and this raises questions about
the role of profit and the purpose of the
defense system. Relaxation of acquisition
regulations for KOs is also limited. Con-
gressional authorization is required in
many cases (executive delegation in all),
and some key questions regarding control
would have to be addressed: Under what
circumstances can regulations be relaxed?
For all KOs? For all acquisitions, from
paper clips to aircraft carriers? And in a
deregulated process, how can fairness
across defense acquisitions be ensured?
Thus, acquisition policies are not inde-
pendent elements to be transformed. In
these instances, radically changing acqui-
sition policy and using PMs, PEOs, and
KOs as agents of change would require
us to focus not only on acquisition but also
on all the other elements within the larger
defense system that would have to be com-
patible and mutually supportive of the
people who were to champion and imple-
ment the changes. In other words, defense
system transformation, not just acquisition
transformation, would be the goal. Fortu-
nately, recent reform initiatives (e.g., Sec-
retary Cohen’s Defense Reform Initiative)
acknowledge the importance of taking a
system’s perspective and have announced
a more comprehensive approach to
change.
Another implication for acquisition re-
form concerns people who will function
in the role of policy entrepreneur. Thanks
to a growing body of research within this
country and throughout the world (Dou-
glas, 1990; Roberts and King, 1996;
Eggers, 1997), we have a greater under-
standing of the strategies and tactics that
successful radical change agents employ.
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But within the acquisition or the defense
system, whom do we see functioning in
this capacity? Is it reasonable to expect
radical policy change from PMs and PEOs
who are central players within the acqui-
sition system?
Research to date suggests that radical
policy change is not initiated from system
insiders. As many have noted, in the press
for radical change, it is too easy for radi-
cal ideas to die on the inside (Roberts and
King, 1996, p. 178). Insiders have the ad-
vantage of system knowledge, but they are
usually limited and confined by existing
organizational responsibilities and roles.
Their daily organizational routines often
drive out the time and activities needed to
cultivate and develop radical ideas. Thus,
the best vantage point for pursuing radi-
cal change is outside the target system.
Outsiders often have more freedom to fo-
cus their attention and their energy. Their
organizational detachment enables them
to pay allegiance to the radical idea and
not to any institution or its supporting
structure. Better to be on the outside cul-
tivating ties with well-placed insiders than
it is to be on the inside suffering from re-
strictions imposed by bureaucratic con-
straints (Roberts and King, 1996).
Other studies support this preference for
outsider status. Entrepreneurs in govern-
ment in nonleadership positions as well
as those in appointed leadership positions
tend to be incrementalists (Levin and
Sanger, 1994; Sanger and Levin, 1992).
Their approach has been described as evo-
lutionary tinkering. They combine old and
familiar things in new ways, but do not
offer fundamental breakthroughs. Most of-
ten, their innovative ideas develop through
trial and error and evolve as adaptations
to existing practice. Using the conceptual
framework introduced above, they engage
in element adaptation rather than element
or system transformation.
We find evidence of element adaptation
and incrementalism in the Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Ac-
quisition and Technology) (OUSD
[A&T]). While the OUSD (A&T) is a rela-
tively high-level position in terms of grade
(ES-xx) and is charged with leading ac-
quisition reform, the incumbent arguably








EDI), two reforms sponsored by the
Deputy Under Secretary, serve as an ex-
ample. Although each policy represents
positive change, neither is considered a
fundamental breakthrough. Both innova-
tions have been used in the industry sec-
tor for two decades and neither affects the
larger defense system as a whole.
Appointed executives tend to view their
roles as limited by the legislature, which
sets broad directions and makes choices
about fundamental issues, new expendi-
tures, and major policy changes. As one
summarized, “For what it’s worth, I think
major new policy initiatives have to come
from elected officials. I mean staff can
have ideas, maybe bounce and buzz off
them. But, ultimately, if you’re going to af-
fect large segments of your public, eith r in
offering a new service or taking something
away that has been there before...that’s the
legislature’s call” (Zegans, 1992, p. 149).
Thus, if this initial research and its logic
holds, radical changes in acquisition
“Research to date
suggests that radical
policy change is not
initiated from
system insiders.”
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policy would mostly likely be launched
by outsiders to the acquisition system,
even by outsiders to the defense system.
Policy entrepreneurs have to be unencum-
bered by the status quo and be willing to
take risks to change the whole system
(Roberts and King, 1996). Returning to
the above example, we would not expect
the OUSD (A&T) or PMs and PEOs to
initiate element or system-level transfor-
mations. As insiders, they are more likely
to be incrementalists far more interested
in tinkering around the edges of current
policy.
So the question still remains: How does
one launch radical reform of acquisition
policy if acquisition is tightly linked to
other defense system elements and can-
not be treated as a separate entity, and in-
siders are likely to opt for incremental
adaptations rather than element or system
transformation? The answer, drawn from
this conceptual framework, suggests that
radical change has to be pursued from the
perspective of the defense system, and it
has to be led by policy entrepreneur out-
siders whose allegiance is to the system
and its integrity rather than to any system
part or element. Finding those individu-
als and unleashing their potential will be-
come the next important step on the way
to radical reform. Their active involve-
ment does not guarantee success; we have
learned that they are one among many fac-
tors at play in the pursuit of radical policy
change (Roberts and King, 1996). But
policy entrepreneurs can and do make a
difference. Reform springs from their ini-
tiative and drive. The process of radical
change cannot begin without them.
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